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1 Fake news is not a new phenomenon. As Burkhardt (2017) pointed out : “the origins of
fake  news  date  back  to  before  the  printing  press.  Rumour  and  false  stories  have
probably been around as long as humans have lived in groups where power matters.”
The  terms  “fake  news”  and  “post-truth”  caught  people’s  attention  by  frequently
appearing in the headlines in the Brexit and 2016 U.S. election campaign. The media
search engine Factiva found 40 hits in the global media for “post-truth” throughout the
year of 2015, but this figure amounted to 2535 hits in the year of 2016 and around 2400
during  the  first  quarter  of  2017  alone  (Lewandowsky  et  al.,  2017).  The  Oxford
Dictionaries nominated “post-truth” Word of the Year 2016, defining it as “relating to
or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public
opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (Dictionary, 2016). According to
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the  Oxford  Dictionaries,  the  phrase  was  first  used  in a  1992  article  in  The  Nation
magazine by the late playwright Steve Tesich. In the article, Tesich lamented that “we,
as a free people, have freely decided that we want to live in some post-truth world”
(Dictionary, 2016). Tesich sought to explain what he called “the Watergate syndrome”,
whereby  “all  the  unpleasant  facts  revealed  by  the  presidency  of  Richard  Nixon
rendered Americans disdainful of uncomfortable truths” (Kreitner, 2016). “Post-truth”
is  regarded  detrimental  to  democracy,  the  Western  order  and  free  public  debate,
raising tensions among nations (Carson, 2019). 
2 According to the 2020 report of China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), by
June 2020, the number of netizens in China had reached 940 million, and China had 932
mobile Internet users. That means 99.2 % of China’s netizens accessed the Internet via
mobile phones ; 77.1 % of netizens used mobile applications for news and information
(CNNIC, 2020). The trend was momentous considering China’s large population base.
With  more  people  turning  to  digital  media  as  the  source  of  news,  fake  news  can
potentially  be  widely  shared  and  spread  on  social  media.  That  has  undoubtedly
exacerbated the social impact of fake news. A study shows that the Chinese public is
often exposed to fake news, and it is widely believed that fake news is a serious social
problem. Most participants of the study think fake news has “largely” or “somewhat”
caused confusions on the basic facts of current issues and events (Willnat et al., 2018).
That same study also suggested that around half of the participants believe that media
outlets, the government and government officials have “great responsibility” for fake
news. “Who to trust” becomes an urgent question, and trust is an asset in this media
ecology. 
3 In January,  2020,  the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the COVID-19 as a
global public health emergency and later characterized it as a pandemic in March. The
misleading media portrayals of COVID-19 as “Chinese Virus” or “Wuhan Virus” were
suspected of triggering anti-Asian sentiments and racist stereotypes (Wulfsohn, 2020).
Against  this  backdrop,  discussions  of  government  roles  in  handling  the  impacts  of
misinformation and fake news are both relevant and meaningful.  This study is  also
important in the sense that the size of rural Internet users in China had reached 285
million, nearly one third of the total netizen population in this country (CNNIC, 2020).
The rural areas are more vulnerable to the impact of fake news than urban citizens
(Elgan, 2019). Through review of literatures, case studies and expert consultation on
the government actions dealing with the impact of fake news, this study endeavors to
answer the following questions : what roles can governments play in creating a news
ecosystem and culture that values and promotes truth ? 
 
Fake news and “post-truth”
4 Fake  news  and  “post-truth”  are  interrelated  but  different  concepts.  Clarifying  the
relationships between them is conducive to further investigations on this topic. 
5 Fake news is fabricated information that mimics the content of news media in form but
without organizational check process (Lazer et al., 2017 ; 2018). In other words, fake
news looks like the product of news organizations with the presumed editorial check,
but is actually fabricated and misleading information. 
6 Various ways of categorizing fake news are also presented in a huge bulk of researches.
Edson et al. (2018) examined 34 academic articles in which “fake news” was employed
China Dealing with the Impact of Fake News : Roles of Governments in the “Pos...
Communication, technologies et développement, 10 | 2021
2
as the key term during the fourteen years from 2003 to 2017, and summarized six ways
that  fake  news  was  operationalized  in  previous  research,  namely  “satire,  parody,
fabrication, manipulation, propaganda, and advertising”. These categories are further
examined from two levels : the salience of fact-based and intent of deception. Another
study also broke the concept of fake news into six types : “alleged foreign interference
in domestic elections, ad-driven invention for financial gain, parody and satire, bad
journalism,  news  that  is  ideologically  opposed,  news  that  challenges  orthodox
authority” (Tambini, 2017, p. 1-5). Such research attempts to unpack the concept are
meaningful for policy-making, as each of these types of fake news requires different
forms of responses and countermeasures (Vasu et al., 2018). 
7 How is the concept of fake news and “post-truth” interrelated ? “Post-truth” refers to a
kind of “circumstances” in which people have less care about truth and facts, and facts
are not as influential and appealing as instigating people’s emotion and personal belief
(Dictionary, 2016 ; McIntyre, 2018). The prefix “post” implied the assumption that the
era before this is one of “truth”, denoting there was an epochal shift from an era of
truth  to  “post-truth”.  “Fake  news”,  however,  is  a  type  of  “false  media  product”
(Corner, 2017, p. 1100).  Fake news is about how much truth is accessed, while post-
truth is about peoples’ attitudes of the truth (Chambers, 2021).
 
Demographic features of “perfect victims”
8 Even  if  individuals  prefer  to  share  high-quality  information,  they  are  not  able  to
discriminate  between facts  and low-quality  information all  the  time due to  limited
individual cognitive capacity and information overload on social  networks, allowing
low-quality information to spread virally (Qiu et al.,  2017).  This helps explain some
groups of peoples’ higher exposure to false information online. The people with certain
features such as older and individuals with more extreme political views are more apt
to  share  fake  news  (Lazer  et  al.,  2017).  A  study  has  found  that  the  likelihood  of
Facebook users over the age of 65 to share fake news is way higher than that of younger
users (Elgan, 2019). 
9 In Chinese context specifically, media literacy enhancement is an urgent issue in rural
areas. The statistics from China's immensely popular messaging app WeChat show that
rural citizens are more apt to share fake news than city residents (Elgan, 2019). The
rural  areas  are  vulnerable  to  political  manipulation,  fake  advertising,  low  quality
messages  and poor  taste  entertainment.  It  is  also  the areas  where the government
could step in and implement educational measures.
 
Countermeasures 
10 Prior literature suggested that the countermeasures to fake news applied in Western
countries mainly take on three forms : 1) verification of the information source 2) fact-
checking 3) stipulation of laws and regulations (Luo, 2018, pp. 126-134). Based on a
review of anti-fake news measures in over forty countries and regions (including both
western and non-western countries), the measures could roughly be divided into three
major  categories :  sanction  measures  by  introducing  and  enforcing  laws  and
regulations,  monitoring  measures  by  fact-checking,  and  awareness  measures  by
enhancing  education  (Funke  &  Flamini,  2021).  Among  the  selected  countries  and
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regions,  Germany,  Singapore  and  China  passed  national  laws  with  concrete  terms
which  give  penalties  to  spreading  fake  news  online,  more  specifically,  fines  or  jail
sentences.  Other  countries  that  got  law  passed  include  France,  Belarus,  Kenya,
Malaysia, Vietnam and Cambodia. In the U.S., several states have passed media literacy
laws which oblige media literacy education in public schools, and a federal law is yet to
be passed . 
11 The  legal  framework  is  informative  in  terms  of  understanding  in  which  ways  the
government intends to moderate online communications, and therefore, it is important
to  understand  what  these  laws  and  regulations  are  to  further  discuss  how  the
government  devises  its  actions  (Wang,  2021).  Take China for  example,  the  national
cyber security law passed in 2016 stipulates that creating or spreading rumors online is
a crime (CAC, 2016). A State Council regulation in 2017 mandates social media platforms
to solely link to and republish news articles from registered news media sources (CAC,
2017). The State Council started from 2018 to require microblogging sites to highlight
and refute rumors on their platforms (Xinhua, 2018). Furthermore, an app launched by
Chinese authorities  providing common people  the channel  to  report  potential  false
information. The app collaborated with platforms like Weibo and WeChat by setting up
accounts on them (Reuters, 2018). Based on the analysis, it is fair to say that China has
some of the strictest laws and regulations against fake news (Funke & Flamini, 2021). 
12 Research on the roles and behaviors of government is growing but still limited. The
current research tends to frame the Chinese government’s role as controller, regulator
or  manager  (Hassid,  2008 ;  Rosen,  2010).  Few  research  went  beyond  the  issue  of
government censorship to authorities’ engagement in online discussions and debates,
and  response  to  public  concerns  raised  in  the  online  sphere  (Wang,  2021).  When
studying the role of government in combatting fake news, this research argues that
public sphere theory offers a helpful lens. 
 
Public Sphere Theory
13 The public sphere is seen as a space of social life where public opinion can be formed
and  public  debate  can  be  conducted  (Habermas,  1991).  The  public  sphere  “as  a
functional element in the political realm was given the normative status of an organ for
the self-articulation of civil society with a state authority corresponding to its needs”
(Habermas, 1989, p. 74). It is the domain where the formation of public opinions and
legitimisation of state and democracy interact with each other. Though Harbermas’s
works of the public sphere derived from his historical reviews of European societies in
the 17th and 18th centuries, the theory is still regarded and being applied by academics
as analytic  lenses of  contemporary issues (Noesselt,  2014 ;  Stockmann & Luo,  2017 ;
Sullivan, 2012). Its functions are not constrained by historical context (Wang, 2021).
Three  dimensions  of  public  spheres  were  generally  emphasized :  openness  of
discussion, longevity of debate and participation of diverse actors (Ferree et al., 2002,
Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015). The three criteria of public sphere are ideal but have not
been realized in social reality. Actually, they are fulfilled to different extent in different
regions or countries (Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015). 
14 In  the  context  of  China,  perhaps  the  case  of  Weibo (Microblogging)  is  the  closest
approximation to online public spheres (Stockmann & Luo, 2017) due to its capability to
reach massive users  and the degree of  freedom of  online expression.  However,  the
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existence  or  possibilities  of  public  spheres  are  a  controversial  field  of  scholarly
discussion. Some research was skeptical and argued that the increasing presence of
government on social media platforms and government’s quick adaption into online
ecology hindered Weibo’s potential to truly engage inclusive debates (Sullivan, 2012 ;
2013). Some other research was more liberal and stressed that some degree of online
discussion is allowed by the Chinese government, rendering social media an instrument
for the public to supervise the government authorities (Jiang, 2010 ; Noesselt, 2014). It
would be improper to entirely deny the existence of  online public  sphere in China
(Rauchfleisch & Schäfer, 2015). The previous research demonstrated a common theme
that  the  role  of  the  government  impacts  the  nurturing  of  an  ecosystem  and
environment  that  values  and  promotes  public  engagement,  inclusive  debates  and
finally truth. 
15 People’s increasing reliance on social media to get information and news facilitates the
digital  expansion  of  the  public  sphere  online,  however,  the  spread  of  fake  news
contaminates  public  judgments  and  opinions,  which  is  detrimental  to  the  truth-
tracking nature of the public sphere democracy (Chambers, 2020). The integrity of the
public sphere relates to more than one actors. This study focuses on the regulatory




16 Two rounds of law expert consultations were organized in Beijing in late May of 2019 to
discuss the levels of legislation, and the weight of each measure in legal terms. 
 
Case analysis
17 The “Jiang Ge Case”1was selected to be analyzed due to its massive impact on the online
debates and relevance to this study. Media reports and research articles on the case
from November of 2016 to 2018 were collected from Chinese newspaper The Beijing
News,  social  media  WeChat  and  Chinese  research  article  database  China  National





18 In the example of “Jiang Ge Case”, when lots of false information was already generated
on network space, some mainstream media failed their responsibility by adding fuel to
netizens’ emotions and thus contributed to the viral moral trial online. Table 1 outlines
the development of media representations of the case.
19 Table 1 : Development of Media Representations of the “Jiang Ge Case”
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Stage  1  (from
November  3,
2016  to  May,
2017)
Jiang Ge, a Chinese student studying in Japan was killed by her roommate’s ex-
boyfriend Chen on November 3, 2016. Several mainstream news outlets covered
the development of the case. The public responses were basically objective and
reasonable during this stage
Stage  2  (from
May,  2017  to
December,
2017)
During  this  period,  the  “moral  witch  hunt”  on  Jiang’s  roommate  Liu  was
increasingly rampant, both in mainstream media as well as on social media. On
November 9, 2017, the Beijing News released an interview video with Liu and Jiang
Ge’s mother. On November 12, the WeChat official account “Mi Meng” published
an article “Liu Xin & Jiang Ge Case : The law can only sanction the murderer, but
who will sanction human nature ?”, which pushed the public opinion trial of Liu to
a climax. The focus of this controversy is mostly on the moral trial of Liu, while
and the case itself and the criminal suspect Chen was very little concerned (Cao &
Dong, 2018). 





During this period, the “Jiang Ge Case” entered the court trial state. The major
media outlets closely followed up on the development in real time. However, the
moral trial of Liu is still the focus of media reports and public opinions. With some
mainstream media calling for rationality, the one-sided public opinion ecology
was reversed to some extent (Jiang & Yao, 2018). 
20 About social  media,  a research collected 347 articles related to “Jiang Ge Case” and
demonstrated that the top ten articles with the most “likes” from the readers basically
showed strong emotions against Liu, the victim’s roommate. Emotional comments and
fake news are rampant on social media Weibo and WeChat, and even some mainstream
media add fuel to public emotions (Cao, & Dong, 2018). Those articles tried to catch
people’s eyeball by agitating them in order to attain financial gains. By doing so, social
trust and morality was undermined, ethics of journalism significantly disintegrated,
and  public  sphere  corrupted.  Journalists  and  the  media  should  take  partial
responsibility for the spread of false news and the decline of media credibility (Willnat
et al., 2018). 
 
Discussion
21 Based on a review of anti-fake news measures, case analysis, and expert consultations,
this study summarized an action framework on dealing with the impact of fake news,
and examined the issue of ambivalent media credibility. A global trust report revealed
that the trust in the U.S. has experienced the record drop among the general public
throughout the survey’s history (Edelman, 2018). Among the four types of institutions
covered by the report, namely government, businesses, media and NGOs, 59 % of people
surveyed in the U.S. think government was most broken. In contrast, within China, the
institutions  see  significant  growth  in  trust  on  government.  Sixty-eight  percent  of
respondents  in  China  think  the  government  is  most  promising  to  lead  to  a  better
future. Four other countries namely India, Indonesia, UAE and Singapore join China at
the top of the Trust Barometer (Edelman, 2018). Despite the cultural and ideological
differences  among  different  societies,  is  there  a  denominator  for  defining  the
government’s role in combatting fake news ? Based on the findings, this study attempts
to elaborate on the government’s role from the following three dimensions. 
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Public sphere guarantor 
22 Though the concept of public sphere was formed in the Western history, it still has
implications in contemporary Chinese society. Due to the unprecedented development
of  communication  technologies,  the  emergence  of  social  media  platforms  such  as
Weibo, WeChat and various news apps is playing a complicated role in shaping public
opinions. Beside the Jiang Ge case, another example would also illustrate the complicity
of the online sphere. Examinations on the case of the high-speed rail accident which
happened in Wenzhou in 2011 suggested that the platform Weibo played a notable role
in tapping the potential of social media in creating a public sphere as the platform,
incubated a new genre of discourse as well as the formation of new social identities ;
However,  the  study  also  indicated  the  large  amount  of  irrational  and  emotional
discussions  on  Weibo  on  this  case.  Sometimes,  expression  of  emotion  was  more
influential than rational discussions about the causes of the derailment accident and
potential  solutions (Zhou & Lu,  2017).  The role of  social  media in creating a public
sphere could face the risk of becoming venting of extreme emotions with rare rational
discussion (Leibold, 2012). This point is in line with the previous observations that the
bottom line is set out for online communication by the government regarding what is
not appropriate and acceptable (Harwit and Clark, 2001 ; Wang, 2021). The government
came onto the field as  “the rule  maker in the communications industry,  arbiter  of
disputes and provider of public services” (Chen, & Zhang, 2012, p. 80). 
23 To build an inclusive and normative public sphere, it is necessary for the government
to  construct  an  authoritative  discourse  based  on  consensus,  while  maintaining  a
humble and open mentality, so as to cope with “post-truth” challenges and to counter
its negative impact (Pang, 2018). If we look back at the origins of government politics, it
could be found that politics was born with the public nature of defending the public
order that transcends any “individual” and “private domain”. It is true that in the long
history of the progress of human political civilization, the boundaries between “public”
and  “private”,  “public  sphere”  and  “private  domain”  are  constantly  changing.
However,  as  a  flow  of  human  civilization,  its  public  nature  of  safeguarding  and
defending human public order is never changed (Jing, 2019). 
 
Constrained moderation provider 
24 Generally  speaking,  the  communication  effect  is  positively  associated  with  the
credibility of the communicator. Individuals are more likely to trust the information
from established or familiar sources and from sources that resonate their preexisting
values (Lazer et al., 2017). Individuals resort to both existing knowledge and judgment
of  the  source  to  authenticate  the  news.  When  both  mechanism  are  not  working,
individuals passively or actively resort to external resources including interpersonal
relations  and  institutions  for  news  authentication  (Edson  et  al.,  2018).  The  past
research sheds lights on the importance of institution credibility and availability of
authoritative  channels  to  help  authenticate  the  media  content  and  to  combat  the
influence of fake news. 
25 The lessons  from Jiang  Ge  case  call  for  stronger  regulation  of  ethics  within  media
industry  itself.  While  owning  substantial  resources  of  the  society,  the  mainstream
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media undertakes major social responsibilities for correcting public opinions when the
latter goes astray. The government cannot and should not be omnipotent. The media
issue should be handled by the media itself  first,  and receive the social supervision
from  the  public,  and  then  the  space  left  for  government  moderation  to  provide
assistance. (Chen, & Zhang, 2012). The government can also provide sources to help the
media practitioners improve the code of conduct, and work with the self-regulatory
mechanism to cope with fake news (Lei & Liu, 2011).
26 The  social  media  companies  use  statistical  models  and  algorithms  to  predict  and
increase  people’s  engagement  with the  content  as  much as  possible  (Bakshy et  al.,
2015). Those models could be adjusted to better filter false information and improve
information  quality.  Either  self-regulation  by  the  platforms  or  government
intervention can be effective in terms of polices regulating the social media platforms
(Lazer  et  al.  ,  2018).  In  practice,  technological  companies  have  rolled  out  a  mix  of
algorithmic-based  and  user-based  initiatives.  WeChat  collaborated  with  more  than
seven hundred third-party organizations to fact-check the information and links on the
platform. The technical efficiency of the platform monitoring is usually good, but the
effectiveness of self-regulation initiatives is seen as limited given that the spread of
fake news has not significantly slowed down (Vasu et al., 2018). Government-platform
collaboration and moderation has a potential here. However, it is important to find the
balancing  point  between  self-regulation  by  the  platforms  and  the  government
moderation.  Too much government  intervention poses  the  risk  of  over  censorship,
which is also undesirable for the sound development of the public domain. 
 
Knowledge production facilitator 
27 From the early knowledge produced in the “Axis Age”, a term coined by the German
philosopher Karl Jaspers, to the era of “knowledge interpretation”, and then to today,
whether it is for the sake of meeting the requirements of the international situation or
driven by  China’s  internal  impetus  for  growth,  production  of  new knowledge  is  in
urgent need (Jiang, 2019). 
28 In  the  “post-truth”  predicament,  the  crisis  of  expression  of  traditional  media  has
triggered the crisis of trust in the audience (Jiang, 2006). The original truth became an
“illusion” to the audience. When they could not find alternative institutions they can
trust, the audience could only seek for the truth by themselves. The news production
organizations are decentralized, and each audience becomes a certain type of media to
produce “information”. The “information” that was originally produced by the mass
media meant to eliminate uncertainty has now become scattered “messages” produced
by the masses. Every message reflects a part of truth, and the whole truth becomes
fragmented.  In  this  sense,  “post-truth”  is  also  post-modern  or  post-deconstruction
stage of news production 
29 This study argues that knowledge is often produced in relation to a specific time, space,
subject  and  discursive  rhetoric.  They  play  a  significant  role  in  the  ordering  and
understanding the social life (Negus & Román-Velázquez, 2000). Meanwhile, this study
also adopts an across time-space perspective, as “the intensification of worldwide social
relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by
events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens, 1990, p. 64). Tackling of
fake news need to be considered in a global context. The interplay among time, space,
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subject  and discourse  is  dynamic  and often assigned meaning through complicated
processes (Negus & Román-Velázquez, 2000). Starting from the knowledge production,
this  section  endeavours  to  review  the  “post-truth”  predicament  from  four  angles,
namely the subject, discourse, time and space, and to position the government’s actions
and roles within the framework. However, this account is by no means exhaustive, but
has highlighted some of the key points considered by this study to be important for the
deeper conversation and interactions. 
 
Subject 
30 Beside people’s dramatic drop of trust in mass media institutions, another impact is the
one brought by the “post-truth” on political communication, as the media discourse
itself acts as the main battlefield of political discourses. Traditionally the mass media
was  the  main  channel  for  the  communication  of  power  institutions  (such  as  the
government) and interest groups. The media played the role of bunker for political
communication. Media and politics work with each other, but they just don’t state this
matter in an explicit way. Originally the government’s credit and the media’s credit
support each other. Now with the media credit fragmented, drifted and shifted, the
government’s  credit  comes unglued. Then what  is  happening in  the  field  of  online
communication ? The government starts to undertake the subject role by creating its
own channel such as its website and other self-owned media. The government began to
communicate itself and express itself even before the beginning of the “post-truth” era.
Against that background, crises began to emerge within political communication both
in terms of the channel and the content. The subjects of knowledge production have to
confront challenges today, be it a person, mechanism or way of expression. 
 
Discourse
31 Truth (in the philosophical sense) is abstract and is an uncountable noun while fact is
concrete and a countable noun. Facts are fragmented and the truth is patchworked by
and abstracted from multiple facts. It can’t be said that a news story always reports
truth, but it is fair to say that it is supposed to report facts. For example, descriptions of
the scene on the spot are facts, which do exist, but that is not truth. Therefore, the
process from facts to truth is a figure of speech, a rhetorical movement (Ling, 1998).
New knowledge is produced in the process.
32 In this rhetorical movement, the media acts as the head and subject. However, in the
“post-truth”  period,  the  head  of  the  rhetoric  is  divided.  What  is  the  underlining
purpose by stitching multiple facts together ? Is the rhetoric head—the media moving
towards the ultimate truth or hidden truth ? Or the part of truth it wants people to
know ? What kind of rhetorical motivation is underlining this discourse ? By reporting
facts, do the media only want the audience to know the incident happened, or also
present the audience with a larger picture, such as the social connections behind that
incident and lead to the ultimate truth based on the facts ? Do the news media reflect
the  people’s  will,  or  are  they  partisan ?  Usually  they  end  up  with  being  partisan.
Therefore,  from  facts  to  truth  is  a  rhetorical  movement  and  a  unique  system  of
language. In the “post-truth” situation, the ecology of the system has been changed and
subverted, including the subject and the discourse executing this rhetorical movement.
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Time
33 Time often reminds people of history, while history was connected through time and
formed  memories.  The  memory  is  a  collective  expression  of  the  continuous  or
intermittent  pieces  of  experience  at  a  certain  moment  (Cassirer,  1955).  The  news
constructs people’s current memory, and the current memory will become history in
the passage of time. As is often said, today's news is tomorrow’s history. 
34 In the “post-truth” predicament, the foundation on which people build their trust and
walk to the future is destabalized. The credit of the country and the media accumulated
in the history is compromised. The past was not solid enough to support the future.
Originally, today's news is tomorrow’s history from the perspective of media content,
reputation and credit,  and we equate news with history and truth. However, in the
“post-truth” context,  it  is  impossible to believe today’s  news is  the real  account of
history, so in this sense today cannot provide support for tomorrow anymore. Then
people turn from the law of causation to the law of relations when judging the value of
the information content. For the law of causation, there is a logical inference from the
cause to the result. When this cause is not solid, the result has nothing to rely on. In the
past ideally, we regard today’s news as the tomorrow’s history, but today the news is
denied as  being the truth as  the “post-truth” implies  half-truth or  no truth at  all.
Therefore, the cause is lost and so is the result. From such a perspective, the technology
such as big data begins to shift from its excessive dependence on the content itself to
the relations of the content. Originally the focus was laid on what kind of thoughts
people hold were influenced by what they consumed, and what ideas were formed. Now
the attention is shifted to what kind of news people are concerned with, and what kind
of  changes  are  incurred  during  the  switching  of  attentions.  Therefore,  the  law  of
causation has turned to the law of relations in the “post-truth” context.
 
Space
35 The concept of space can be understood from three dimensions. The first dimension is
physical, like the boundary between the states and the regions ; the second dimension
is cultural, such as visible customs, habits, and beliefs conventionalized over history.
The third dimension is cognitive, the cognitive boundary behind the visible culture.
The  cognitive  space  is  imaginary,  abstract,  and  heterogeneous.  In  the  “post-truth”
predicament, the expression crisis of the media impacts the space in multiple senses. 
36 In  terms  of  the  physical  space,  the  communication  space  is  reorganized  and  that
reorganization is visible. For example, if the U.S. media don’t tend to report the facts,
then  other  countries  must  stand  out  and  do  so,  and  vice  versa.  The  global
communication  space  will  be  reorganized  and  reshaped, though  this  gets  heavily
influenced  by  national  priorities  and  propaganda.  The  replacement  of  the  subject
creates room and opportunities for emerging players in the communication space. 
37 From the perspective of the cognitive space, because people’s trust in traditional media
is compromised in the “post-truth” context, the size of the new cognitive space for
trust is extended. But what will fill or guide this new space for trust now and in the
future ?  That  question  requires  the  impetus  and  mechanism  of  new  knowledge
production  to  fill  the  new  space.  Then  who  is  the  main  body  of  new  knowledge
production ?  And  who  can  facilitate  the  production  mechanism ?  New  information
technologies such as VR, AR, AI provide the possibility for pan-media in the future. For
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example,  the  driverless  cars  can  automatically  transmit  signals  within  300  meters
through software and chips. The intelligent and global circulation of information is also
possible  if  every  building  and  road  are  equipped  with  such  chips.  Everything  is
recordable and traceable. People need only to check the video recording in the street
corner to restore the facts of a violent incident. In reality for example, the initial stage
of pan-media has been realized in north China’s city Yinchuan through the government
microblog, where people can report problems and get responses (Cao, 2017). This case
demonstrated that the government could actually play an active part in the space of
new  knowledge  production.  The  pan-media  age  means  the  decentralization  of  the
subject. With the aid of artificial intelligence coupled with the distributed preservation
of block chains, the panorama of a city can be rendered seamlessly, and the technology
ensures the authenticity of the recording that on one can tamper with. In this way the
facts  are being approached infinitely.  The augmented fact  from a multidimensional




38 In the mass communication age, the traditional mass media established its reputation
based  on  the  professional  norms  such  as  doing  “authentic,  objective,  and  timely”
reporting, which was regarded by audience as facts about the world due to the credit of
the  media  accumulated  over  the  history.  However,  the  successive  misreports  by
mainstream media, such as CNN’s distorting report on the Tibetan issue and cropping
out  photo  images  (The  Observers,  2008),  have  debunked  the  media  myth  to  some
extent. The reputation and credit conscientiously established throughout the U.S. mass
communication  history  by  education,  technology,  and  communication  have  been
compromised. It can be said that the U.S. is facing a “post-truth” predicament featured
by the crisis of expression caused by the expression of crisis (Jiang, 2006). The public
can no longer continue to trust that the news media is the channel to deliver the facts,
and then trust is partially transferred to social media. The latter is functioning as both
the platform as well as content provider.
39 This study elaborates on the response, engagement and epistemic role of authoritative
agent  in  current  media  ecology.  Based  on  review  of  literatures,  case  analysis,  and
expert  consultation,  this  study  elaborated  on  the  government’s  roles  from  three
dimensions,  as  public  sphere  guarantor,  constrained  moderation  provider  and
knowledge production facilitator in its efforts to create a news ecosystem and culture
that values and promotes truth. 
40 Frist,  this  research  enriches  the  understanding  of  public  sphere  theory  in  current
media ecology. The criterion of public spheres such as open discussion, longevity of
debate and participation of diverse actors (Ferree et al., 2002, Rauchfleisch & Schäfer,
2015) still sheds light but needs to take on a new touch. The relatively unconstrained
nature of social media and the ambivalent mass media credibility have made the online
spheres increasingly complicated. The quick spread of fake news is one of the thorny
issues. It is a common enemy of all governments and peoples, and it needs to be tackled
with rational judgement, proper intervention and human wisdom. 
41 Second, the role of governments in combatting fake news has been a myth without
sufficient  answers.  This  study  goes  beyond  the  issue  of  government  censorship  or
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authoritarian system, and explores when and where the authorities could play a proper
role in light of public sphere theory. Meanwhile, this study expands the discussions in
terms of time, space, subject and discourse, and attempts to contribute to the current
literature  by  offering  discussions  about  government  roles  in  the  “post-truth”
predicament. 
42 For the moment, the large body of discussion in this study is more qualitative in nature.
For  future  research,  hopefully  a  more  meticulous  quantitative  scale  could  be
formulated for the measure of the government performance in coping with fake news.
The mutually complementing research efforts are worthwhile because in the “post-
truth” context, people still seek for facts and aspire for truth.
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NOTES





With the advancement of communication technology and increasing number of people turning to
their mobile devices for news and information, social media is functioning as both the platform
as well as content provider. However, fake news could also travel faster and wider, while the
traditional gatekeeping process of media diminishes. In the context of the Brexit referendum and
the U.S. presidential campaign in 2016, the spike of “post-truth” in the headlines spurred heated
discussions of the tension between “appeals to emotion” and “objective facts”. Based on a review
of anti-fake news measures,  case analysis,  and expert consultations,  this study examined the
government’s roles from three dimensions, as public sphere guarantor, constrained moderation
provider and knowledge production facilitator in the efforts to create a news ecosystem that
values and promotes truth. 
Avec le progrès des technologies de la communication et le nombre croissant de personnes qui se
tournent vers leurs appareils mobiles pour obtenir des actualités et des informations, les médias
sociaux  servent  à  la  fois  de  plateforme  et  de  fournisseur  de  contenu.  Cependant,  les  intox
(ou fakes  news )  peuvent  aussi  circuler  plus  rapidement  et  plus  largement,  tandis  que  le
processus traditionnel de contrôle des médias diminue. Dans le contexte du référendum sur le
Brexit et de la campagne présidentielle américaine de 2016, le pic de "post-vérité" dans les gros
titres a suscité des discussions animées sur la tension entre les "appels à l'émotion" et les "faits
objectifs".  Sur  la  base  d'un examen des  mesures  anti-fake  news,  d'une  analyse  de  cas  et  de
consultations d'experts, cette étude a examiné les rôles du gouvernement sous trois dimensions,
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en  tant  que  garant  de  la  sphère  publique,  fournisseur  de  modération  sous  contrainte  et
facilitateur de la production de connaissances dans les efforts visant à créer un écosystème de
nouvelles qui valorise et promeut la vérité. 
Con l'avanzamento della tecnologia della comunicazione e il crescente numero di persone che si
rivolgono ai loro dispositivi mobili per notizie e informazioni, i social media stanno funzionando
sia come piattaforma che come fornitore di contenuti. Tuttavia, le fake news potrebbero anche
viaggiare più velocemente e più ampiamente, mentre il tradizionale processo di gatekeeping dei
media  diminuisce.  Nel  contesto  del  referendum  sulla  Brexit  e  della  campagna  presidenziale
statunitense  nel  2016,  il  picco  di  "post-verità"  nei  titoli  dei  giornali  ha  stimolato  accese
discussioni  sulla  tensione  tra  "appelli  alle  emozioni"  e  "fatti  oggettivi".  Sulla  base  di  una
revisione delle misure anti-fake news, dell'analisi dei casi e delle consultazioni di esperti, questo
studio ha esaminato i ruoli del governo da tre dimensioni, come garante della sfera pubblica,
fornitore di moderazione vincolata e facilitatore della produzione di conoscenza negli sforzi per
creare un ecosistema di notizie che valorizza e promuove la verità. 
INDEX
Keywords: “Post-truth”, fake news, government role, public sphere, knowledge production
Mots-clés: "Post-vérité", fake news, rôle du gouvernement, sphère publique, production de
connaissances.
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